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THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF DELAWARE LAW 
(INCLUDING A BRIEF EXEGESIS ON FEE SHIFTING BYLAWS) 
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Online Law Review for the University of Denver will, for the 
third time, publish an entire issue of student papers on a common topic in 
the area of corporate law and governance.  Past issues have involved 
discussions of the JOBS Act2 and proxy plumbing issues.3  The third 
issue for the first time looks at topics under Delaware law.   
Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies.4   
This has  not always been the case.  At the beginning of the 20th Centu-
ry, other states such as New Jersey competed successfully for charters.5  
Nonetheless, the title eventually shifted to Delaware, with other states 
providing no serious competition.6    
The title brought financial benefits,7 something recognized overtly.8  
As a result, changes to the corporate code reflected the influence of “pro-
  
 † Professor of Law & Director, Corporate & Commercial Law Program, University of 
Denver Sturm College of Law.   
 2. Jobs Act Issue, DULR ONLINE, (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.denverlawreview.org/jobs-
act-feature. 
 3. “Proxy Plumbing” Issue, DULR ONLINE, (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://www.denverlawreview.org/proxy-plumbing. 
 4. Other states generally view Delaware law as persuasive.  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The 
Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 
317, 347 (2004) (“Delaware decisions interpreting management's fiduciary obligations are widely 
followed by other states.”).   
 5. See Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor 
Protection, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 195 n.9 (1958) (noting that New Jersey adopted the 
first “liberal” general incorporation statute in 1896).  
 6. As has long been recognized, “competition” in the area of corporate governance comes 
not from other states but from the federal government.  See Ernest L. Folk, III, Some Reflections of a 
Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 409, 426 (1968) (stating as a prophecy the “shift to 
federal law administered through federal tribunals is a long-run secular trend, not likely to be al-
tered”); see also infra note 72.   
 7. For a discussion of the financial benefits to Delaware, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & 
Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and the Race to 
the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 306 (2009).   
 8. When the legislature sought to create a committee to consider revisions to the state’s 
general corporation law in the 1960s, the resolution noted that “the favorable climate which the State 
of Delaware has traditionally provided for corporations has been a leading source of revenue for the 
State”.  See An Act Making an Appropriation to the Secretary of State for a Comprehensive Review 
and Study of the Corporation Laws of the State for the Preparation of a Report Containing Recom-
mended  Revisions of Such Laws for submission to the General Assembly, 122nd General Assembly, 
Dec. 31, 1963, available at http://delcode.delaware.gov/sessionlaws/ga122/chp218.shtml   The 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601101 
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management corporation attorneys.”9  Measured by the number of public 
companies incorporated in the state, the approach proved highly success-
ful.  By 1971, more than 200 of the companies in the Fortune 500 were 
incorporated in the Delaware,10 a number that had increased to over 300 
by 2014.11 
The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by 
the existence of a favorable statutory regime.  Delaware was not invaria-
bly the first or the only state to implement management friendly provi-
sions.12 Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical im-
portance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an 
outsized role in setting legal standards.13  The management friendly na-
ture of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attrac-
tion to public corporations.14 
Management friendly decisions generally divided into three catego-
ries, those that:  (1) maximized board discretion; (2) minimized board 
liability; and (3) facilitated director retention.15  A current example of a 
management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions 
setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involv-
  
revisions are discussed in S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. 
CORP. LAW 1, 14 (1976).   
 9. Ernest L. Folk, III, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 
409, 411 (1968) (noting that the Delaware code adopted in 1967 was drafted by a committee that 
“consisted chiefly of pro-management corporation attorneys”).  This phenomenon is not limited to 
Delaware.  See Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50 
CORNELL L. REV. 599, 616 (1965) (“But the personnel of the corporation law drafting committees in 
most states are usually identified psychologically with management.”).   
 10. See Ernest L. Folk, III, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR 
J. 409, 412 n.5 (1968) (noting that as of Jan. 1968, 203 of the corporations in the Fortune 500 were 
incorporated in Delaware).   
 11. See Christopher Wink, 64% of Fortune 500 firms are Delaware incorporations: here’s 
why, TECHNICAL.LY DELAWARE, (Sept. 23, 2014), http://technical.ly/delaware/2014/09/23/why-
delaware-incorporation/. 
 12. In the aftermath of the decision in Van Gorkom, Delaware authorized corporations to 
amend their certificate to eliminate liability for breaches of the duty of care.  See J. Robert Brown, 
Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and the 
Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 306 (2009).  (Delaware was actually the second state to 
legislatively overturn the decision.  Moreover, all states eventually followed suit.)   
 13. The fiduciary duties of directors are determined as a matter of common law.  See CA v. 
AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).   
 14. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L. J. 663, 690 (1974) (describing the courts as having a “laissez faire” attitude towards fiduciary 
duties and management’s responsibilities to shareholders); see also Gideon Mark, Multijurisdiction-
al M&A Litigation, 40 J. CORP. L. 291, 320 (Winter 2015) (noting that Delaware is “widely regarded 
as management-friendly”).  For a discussion of the management friendly evolu-
tion of corporate law doctrines by the Delaware courts, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., 
The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Compa-
nies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 338-49 (2004). 
 15. See  J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the 
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 331 (2004).   
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ing the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its direc-
tors.16   
II. FEE SHIFTING BYLAWS 
A. Bylaw Authority and the Board of Directors  
Section 109(a) of the DGCL gives shareholders the power to adopt 
bylaws.17  The board of directors may also do so if expressly permitted in 
the certificate.18  Delaware corporations universally accede to manage-
ment the right to adopt bylaws.19  As a result, both groups can adopt, 
amend and repeal bylaws.   
The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corpora-
tion, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or 
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”20  The 
broad parameters are, however, subject to limits.  Bylaws cannot be in-
consistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.”21  Law in-
cludes the common law.22   
The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the 
law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws.  They 
have found limitations on this authority in both the DGCL and the com-
mon law.  Under the DGCL, shareholders cannot adopt bylaws that inter-
fere with the board’s statutory authority to manage the corporation;23 
under the common law, they cannot adopt bylaws that interfere with the 
  
 16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.   
 17. § 109(a)      
 18. Id. (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorpora-
tion, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors”).      
 19. Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., C.A. No. 8626–VCL, 2013 WL 5967028  (Del. Ch. Nov. 
7, 2013) (noting that such authority is “customarily given”).   
 20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b).  The formulation is fundamentally different from the 
language in the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”).  The MBCA formulation makes no 
explicit mention of the rights of shareholders or directors.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06(b) 
(2006) (“The bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for managing the business and 
regulating the affairs of the corporation that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorpora-
tion.”).  States that do mimic Delaware and include language with respect to shareholders and direc-
tors do not explicitly allow bylaws that apply to “employees.”  See N.Y. BUS. CORP. ACT. LAW § 
601(b) (2013) (bylaws may regulate the “rights or powers of its shareholders, directors or officers”).   
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b)      
 22. See CA v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).  See also Franz 
Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (“A bylaw that is inconsistent with any 
statute or rule of common law, however, is void”).  The limitation is a longstanding one.  See Klotz 
v. Pan-American Match Co., 108 N.E. 764, 221 Mass. 38, 43 (Mass. 1915) (“Undoubtedly a corpo-
ration may make reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of the inspection of its books 
by stockholders. But it cannot make a by-law which denies or unreasonably obstructs their common-
law right.”) 
 23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141.   
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board’s fiduciary obligations.24  These limits cast doubt on bylaws that 
purport to impose mandatory obligations on the board.25 
The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar re-
straints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors.  This can be seen 
with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of share-
holders to bring actions against management and the corporation.  Such 
rights sometimes arise under the DGCL but are also found in the com-
mon law.   
Shareholders have a common law right to bring derivative actions.26  
In Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,27 the 
Chancery Court addressed a bylaw that designated Delaware as the “sole 
and exclusive forum” for such actions.28  Because Section 109(b) author-
ized bylaws that governed the “rights” of shareholders, the court found 
the issue to be a matter of “easy linguistics” and upheld the provision. As 
for the unusual nature of a bylaw restricting access to judicial process, 
the opinion merely observed that “the Supreme Court [had] long ago 
rejected the position that board action should be invalidated or enjoined 
simply because it involves a novel use of statutory authority”.29 
The analysis ignored any number of potential limitations on board 
authority with respect to forum selection bylaws.  At a minimum, the 
limitation  was inserted into the wrong document.  Forum selection by-
laws “limited” the rights of shareholders.30  Under the DGCL, bylaws 
could address the “rights” of shareholders; limitations were to be includ-
ed in the certificate.31  Moreover, the distinction had a compelling logic; 
limitations could only be imposed if first approved by shareholders.32  
  
 24. See AFSCME Emps., 953 A.2d at 239-40.     
 25. See Ben Walther, Bylaw Governance, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 432 (2015) 
(noting that the case “serves to invalidate any bylaws that are-- whatever their purpose--functionally 
controlling the board”).   
 26. Derivative suits arose under principles of equity.  See Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 32 
Del.Ch. 18, 78 A.2d 473, 475 (1951) (“[E]quity will permit a stockholder to sue in his own name for 
the benefit of the corporation solely for the purpose of preventing injustice when it is apparent that 
the corporation's rights would not be protected otherwise.”).  The legislature has adopted provisions 
that regulate derivative suits.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 327.  Nonetheless, the courts have con-
tinued to treat these actions as a matter of common law.  See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 204 
(Del. 2008) (“The equitable standing of a stockholder to bring a derivative action was judicially 
created but later restricted by a statutory requirement that a stockholder plaintiff must either have 
been a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which she complains or her stock must have 
devolved upon her thereafter by operation of law.”).   
 27. 73 A.3d 934, 942 (Del. Ch. 2013).   
 28. In addition to derivative actions, the bylaw applied to claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
against “any director, officer or other employee”, actions arising under the DGCL, and any claim 
“governed by the internal affairs doctrine.” Id.   
 29. Id. at 953. 
 30. A limitation connotes a “restriction.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1012 (9th ed. 2009).  
Forcing shareholders to litigate in a specified forum falls within this definition.   
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (certificate of incorporation could include “[a]ny 
provision . . . limiting . . . the powers . . . of the stockholders”). 
 32. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (requiring stockholder approval of amendments to the 
certificate).   
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Chevron, however, eliminated the safeguard and allowed management to 
unilaterally adopt bylaws  that restricted the ability of shareholders to 
select the relevant forum.     
The bylaw also went beyond the language of Section 109(b).  The 
provision applied to the rights of “shareholders.”  Forum selection by-
laws, however, controlled the choice of forum not only in derivative ac-
tions but also in class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty.33  Alt-
hough at one time owning shares, plaintiffs in class actions no longer 
needed to retain their status as such.34  Nonetheless, the bylaw at issue in 
Chevron facially applied to these former shareholders.     
Most importantly, however, the court opened the door to the 
use of bylaws to regulate judicial process.  The court in CA justi-
fied the position by treating the subject matter as an “internal af-
fair” of the corporation,35 a traditional limit on bylaws.36  Incon-
sistent with the historical role of bylaws, the approach confused the 
substance of a claim with the process used to maintain an action.37  
The internal affairs doctrine was designed to protect directors and 
shareholders from conflicting duties and “competing demands.”38  
The doctrine avoided the result by providing a single source of 
  
 33. To bring a derivative action, plaintiffs must be shareholders at the time of the alleged 
wrong.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (imposing contemporaneous ownership requirement on 
shareholder bringing derivative action).  In addition, plaintiff must hold the shares through the date 
of final disposition.  See Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 375 A.3d 888, 897 (Del. 
2013) (noting that continuous ownership requirement “is settled Delaware law and has been consist-
ently followed since 1984.”); Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 264 (Del. 1995) 
(“a plaintiff must also maintain his shareholder status throughout the derivative litigation.”). 
 34. See Temple v. Combined Props. Corp., 410 A.2d 1375, 1376 (Del. Ch. 1979) (class action 
brought by “former stockholder”).   
 35. The opinion uses the phrase “internal affairs” thirty-three times.   
 36. See Samuel Willison, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 2 HARV. 
L. REV. 105, 122–23 (1888) (“But by the change in the conception of a corporation from an institu-
tion for special government to a simple instrumentality for carrying on a large business, the right to 
pass by-laws was restricted to regulations for the management of the corporate business.”); Judd F. 
Sneirson, Green is Good:  Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Govern-
ance,  94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 996–97 (Mar. 2009) (“Bylaws govern a corporation's internal affairs.”);  
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 3d Ed. 2010 
(“The bylaws establish rules for the internal governance of the corporation. Bylaws deal with such 
matters as how the corporation's internal affairs are to be conducted by its officers, directors, and 
stockholders.”); see also Henry DuPont Ridgely, Essay: The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate 
Governance, SMU CORPORATE COUNSEL SYMPOSIUM 4 (2015), 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2014/11/The_Emerging_Role_of_Bylaws_in_Corporate_G
overnance-copy.pdf  (“As this early corporate history demonstrates, bylaws have long been needed 
to govern the manner in which an organization operates.”).   
 37. See Corporations – Stockholders:  Powers of Majority – Expulsion of Competing Share-
holders By Amending By-Laws, 33 HARV. L. REV. 979 (May 1920) (noting that “restrictions on the 
right of members to sue the corporation” have “uniformly been held invalid.”). 
 38. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a 
conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate 
a corporation's internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corpora-
tion and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be 
faced with conflicting demands.”).   
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substantive law.  Because other forums were required to apply the 
law of the state of incorporation, little risk existed of inconsistent 
substantive standards.39  Forum selection bylaws were not, there-
fore, about ensuring legal uniformity but mandating a specific set 
of decision makers.   
Chevron, therefore, dramatically increased the scope of by-
laws adopted by the board of directors.  Given the preponderance 
of businesses incorporated in Delaware and the management 
friendly nature of the courts, the rational also had the effect of val-
idating bylaws that would ensure a greater role for Delaware in 
corporate litigation.40  Nonetheless, the decision purported to limit 
the reach of bylaws to those governing a corporation’s internal 
affairs.  Moreover, the consequences of the bylaws were reduced 
by the role of foreign courts in their enforcement.41   
B. ATP and Fee Shifting Bylaws 
The restrictions on board adopted bylaws preserved in Chevron dis-
appeared in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund.42 In that case, 
the court addressed a certified question asking about the validity of 
fee shifting bylaws in the context of a non-stock company.  The bylaw 
had little relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation.  It applied 
not only to actions by owners but also to “prior” owners and third parties 
providing “substantial assistance” to, or having a financial interest in, a 
claim.  The bylaw was not limited to derivative and other similar actions 
but extended to “any” claim.  Indeed, the certified question came from a 
federal district court seeking to determine the applicability of the bylaw 
in the context of an antitrust claim.  Finally, only the claiming party and 
  
 39. Vantagepoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 2005) 
(“Applying Delaware's well-established choice-of-law rule-the internal affairs doctrine-the Court of 
Chancery recognized that Delaware courts must apply the law of the state of incorporation to issues 
involving corporate internal affairs, and that disputes concerning a shareholder's right to vote fall 
squarely within the purview of the internal affairs doctrine.”).   
 40. See Anne M. Tucker, The Short Road Home:  Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. 
Chevron, 7 J. BUS. ENTREP. & L. 467, 483-84 (Spring 2014) (“The end result of Chevron and its 
supporting cases will be to concentrate corporate litigation in Delaware, which is not an unintended 
consequence.”).  The bylaws have apparently had this effect.  See Shareholder Litigation Involving 
Acquisitions of Public Companies: Review of 2014 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH  3 
(2014), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/897c61ef-bfde-46e6-a2b8-
5f94906c6ee2/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review.pdf (“For acquisitions of 
Delaware-incorporated companies, the Delaware Court of Chancery gained ground as a filing desti-
nation, likely reflecting the choice of this court as the exclusive litigation forum.”). 
 41. The enforcement of these bylaws has been mixed.  The decisions in this area are discussed 
in one of the articles in this issue.  See Patrick J. Rohl, The Reassertion of the Primacy of Delaware 
and Forum Selection Bylaws, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 143 (2015).   
 42. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
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not the company was at risk for fee shifting and could be liable in some 
cases even if successful on the merits.43     
In a brief and shockingly cursory discussion,44 the decision upheld 
the bylaw as facially valid.45 The court noted the absence of any explicit 
limitation on fee shifting bylaws in the DGCL46 and concluded that the 
allocation of “risk among parties in intra-corporate litigation would . . . 
appear to satisfy” Section 109.47  Moreover, characterizing bylaws as 
contractual, the court determined that fee shifting bylaws were affirma-
tively permitted.48   
The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities.  First, 
unlike Chevron, the bylaw at issue was not limited to matters affecting 
the entity’s internal affairs.  The bylaw on its face extended to any claim, 
something that could include not only those under the antitrust laws but 
also the federal securities laws.49  Likewise, the obligation in the DGCL 
to include “limits” on shareholder rights in the certificate was all but 
ignored.50  The bylaw also extended to persons who never owned 
shares.51 The interpretation, therefore, completely unmoored bylaws 
from the language of the DGCL.     
The decision also did not take into account the one-sided nature of 
the bylaw.  The provision shifted fees where owners failed to substantial-
  
 43. The bylaw shifted fees unless the claiming party “substantially achieve[d]” the “full 
remedy sought.” Id. at 559–60.    
 44. The opinion consisted of a meager 2835 words.  Compare that with the more recent deci-
sion in C&J Energy, a case in which the court dedicated 13,706 words to an analysis of a board’s 
“Revlon duties.”  C&J Energy Servs. Inc., v. City of Miami Gen. Emps., 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014).   
 45. The operative analysis consisted of four sentences and two footnotes.  The court cited no 
cases, treatises, or other authority in the one paragraph discussion.     
 46. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) (“Neither the 
DGCL nor any other Delaware statute forbids the enactment of fee-shifting bylaws.”).     
 47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not incon-
sistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, 
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, direc-
tors, officers or employees.”).   
 48. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) (“But it is 
settled that contracting parties may agree to modify the American Rule and obligate the losing party 
to pay the prevailing party's fees. Because corporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a corporation's 
shareholders,’ a fee-shifting provision contained in a nonstock corporation's validly-enacted bylaw 
would fall within the contractual exception to the American Rule.”).    
 49. To the extent applicable to claims under the federal securities laws, the provision had the 
capacity to treat differently different classes of plaintiffs injured by the same fraud.  The bylaw 
presumably shifted fees where actions were brought by shareholders.  Fraud actions under the secu-
rities laws are not, however, limited to classes of shareholders.  See James J. Park, Bondholders and 
Securities Class Actions, 99 MINN. L. REV. 585 (Dec. 2014).   
 50. Limits in turn were required to be in the charter.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1).  
The court was aware of the legislative mandate but chose to disregard it.  See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 
558 (“The corporate charter could permit fee-shifting provisions, either explicitly or implicitly by 
silence.”). 
 51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (allowing bylaws that governed the “rights” of share-
holders).  See also Vantagepoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 
2005) (“The internal affairs doctrine applies to those matters that pertain to the relationships among 
or between the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders.”), 
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ly achieve the requested remedy but did not impose similar obligations 
on the company.52 The unequal application arguably rendered the bylaw 
inequitable on its face.53 
Finally, the court did adequately address the requirement in Section 
109(b) that  bylaws be consistent with “the law.”  The decision obliquely 
acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litiga-
tion” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence 
on shareholders causes of action.54  Indeed, the court affirmatively mini-
mized the concern, emphasizing that the “intent to deter litigation . . . 
[was] not invariably an improper purpose.”55 
The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not 
eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law.  
To the extent applicable to the exercise of inspection rights, fee shifting 
bylaws had the capacity to prevent shareholders from obtaining access to 
corporate books and records,56 a basis for invaliding bylaws in other cir-
cumstances.57  Likewise, to the extent applicable to suits seeking a judi-
cial determination of fair value, fee shifting bylaws had the ability to 
deny shareholders their statutory right to appraisal.58  Likewise, the by-
laws threatened to curtail direct claims involving common law duties.59  
Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly lim-
ited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the cor-
poration and the board.60  Given the high dismissal rates for these ac-
  
 52. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Pri-
vate Enforcement?, Columbia Blue Sky Reporter (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-it-still-believe-in-
private-enforcement/ (noting that fee shifting bylaws were “ one-sided; that is, a defendant who 
loses does not pay the successful plaintiff’s fees and expenses.”).   
 53. ATP acknowledged that a facially valid bylaw could be facially invalidated as inequitable.  
See ATP, 91 A.3d at 558 (“Whether the specific ATP fee-shifting bylaw is enforceable, however, 
depends on the manner in which it was adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. 
Bylaws that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if adopted or used for an inequita-
ble purpose.”).   
 54. Id. at 560. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220.  The provision allows shareholders denied a right to 
inspect to bring an action in the Chancery Court “for an order to compel such inspection.”  Id.  
Actions to appraise the value of shares are “in the nature of the class action.”  Ala. By-Products 
Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 260 (Del. 1995).   
 57. See Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78, 81 (Del. Ch. 1968) 
(“Section 220 gives ‘any’ stockholder a ‘right’ to inspect a list of stockholders.  It follows that 
Commercial Credit's certificate of incorporation limiting inspection to a person or persons holding 
25% of the outstanding stock is void.”).   
 58. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.  Appraisal right actions are discussed in this issue.  See 
Jennifer McLellan, An Appraisal of Appraisal Rights in Delaware, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 109 
(2015).   
 59. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del.2004) (set-
ting out standards for differentiating direct and derivative claims).   
 60. Courts have created a number of actions under the common law.  In addition to derivative 
actions, they include quasi appraisal action.  See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 134 (Del. 
2009).   
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tions,61 fee shifting bylaws imposed   a meaningful risk of liability on 
plaintiffs.62  Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid 
to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk 
of liability without any offsetting direct benefit.  By preventing suits in 
this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from 
legal challenge. 
This effect was not lost on the Corporation Law Council, a commit-
tee of the Delaware State Bar Association, when drafting legislation de-
signed to address fee shifting provisions.  As the accompanying com-
mentary noted: 
The purpose and effect of these provisions is to significantly, if not 
completely, deter the enforcement of stockholder protections.  Stock-
holder suits are generally brought by one or more stockholders on 
behalf of, or to benefit, many stockholders.  Very few, if any, stock-
holders will be willing to risk individually paying the corporation’s 
legal fees on behalf of other stockholders.  Accordingly, fee-shifting 
effectively eliminates stockholder rights, because stockholder litiga-
tion is the only method of enforcing them.  This would be a radical 
change in the corporate landscape.
63
 
The view was also supported by the actual behavior of counsel in litiga-
tion implicating fee shifting bylaws.64 Moreover, the risk was exacerbat-
  
 61. Comprehensive data in this area is not easy to find.  Nonetheless, dismissals in derivative 
suits are common.  See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1789 (2010) (“An additional 43 percent of the resolved 
suits (73 out of 170) in my study were involuntarily dismissed by the court.  These involuntary 
dismissals almost always turned on procedural grounds, rather than the merits of the derivative 
plaintiff’s claims.”).  The same is true with respect to actions brought under the federal securities 
laws.  See Dr. Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litiga-
tion: 2013 Full-Year Review, NERA, January 21, 2014, available at   
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_2013_Year_End_Trends_1.2014
.pdf (“Out of the motions to dismiss for which a court decision was reached, the following three 
outcomes account for the vast majority of the decisions: granted (48%),10 granted in part and denied 
in part (25%), and denied (21%).”).  These statistics understate the risks.  Under the typical fee 
shifting bylaw, shareholders are required to pay fees where they do not “substantially achieve” the 
remedy sought.  Even if the case is not dismissed, therefore, they may be required to pay the fees of 
the defendants. 
 62. Derivative actions are a matter of common law.  See supra note 27.  So are actions under 
the federal securities laws.  See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolu-
tion in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 865 (2003) (Justice Powell describing law 
under Rule 10b-5 as “a species of federal common law”).   
 63. Fee-Shifting FAQS 2, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/legislation/delaware-stat-revisions/Council-Second-Proposal-FAQs-3-6-15.pdf.   
 64. Strougo v. Hollander, C.A. No. 9770-CB, 2015 WL 1189610, at *4 n.19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
16, 2015) (“Tellingly, in the only other case in this Court of which I am aware in which a non-
reciprocal fee-shifting bylaw has been the subject of litigation, the stockholder plaintiff moved to 
invalidate the fee-shifting bylaw or, alternatively, to dismiss the action and to permit plaintiff’s 
counsel to withdraw.”); see also Transcript, Kastis v. Carter, No. 8657, Del. Ch., Aug. 22, 2014, at 
17 (“if a bylaw may apply to these plaintiffs, they cannot -- and virtually no stockholder can [main-
tain an action], particularly in a derivative case. You have no direct interest in any recovery and your 
indirect interest is going to be minimal.”).  The transcript is available here:  
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/governance-cases/kastis/Transcript-
Discussing-Amendment-to-Bylaw-Kastis-v-Carter-Case-No-8657-CB-Aug-15-2014.pdf 
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ed by the substantial fees charged by counsel in defending these ac-
tions.65 
C. Consequences   
The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and  overstepped acceptable 
boundaries.  The management friendly decision  threatened the preemi-
nent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law.  The decision 
raised the specter of federal intervention and  the potential for meaning-
ful competition from the states. 
By allowing bylaws unmoored from a corporation’s internal affairs, 
the ATP court effectively invited other states to adopt alternative, even 
conflicting, approaches.  They could implement provisions that invalided 
the bylaws by extending to the courts the exclusive authority to award 
fees,66 an approach taken in Section 11(e) of the Securities Act of 1933.67  
Such an approach would provide shareholders with an incentive to bring 
actions in these jurisdictions, diminishing the role of the Delaware 
courts.   
An indication of the questionable reasoning could be seen from the 
negative response to the ATP decision.  Almost immediately, lower 
courts began to restrict its reach.  In Strougo v. Hollander, the court con-
sidered a fee shifting bylaw adopted after the plaintiffs ceased to be 
shareholders.68  The decision expressed concern with fee shifting bylaws, 
noting that they raised “serious policy questions” as to whether “it would 
be statutorily permissible and/or equitable to adopt bylaws that function-
ally deprive stockholders of an important right: the right to sue to vindi-
cate their interests as stockholders.”69  In the end, however, the court 
invalidated the bylaw on narrow grounds, concluding that, under Section 
109, the board lacked the authority to bind persons who had ceased to be 
  
 65. For a discussion of “skyrocketing” defense costs in securities class action law suits, see 
Douglas W. Greene, The Root Cause of Skyrocketing Securities Class Action Defense Costs, LANE 
POWELL, http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/09/09/the-root-cause-of-skyrocketing-securities-
class-action-defense-costs/ 
 66. Oklahoma put in place a statutory provision that required fee shifting for both domestic 
and foreign companies in certain circumstances.  See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126(C).  For a discus-
sion of the provision, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Fee Shifting in Derivative Suits and the 
Oklahoma Legislature, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM BLOG (Sept. 24, 2014),  
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/fee-shifting-in-derivative-suits-and-the-oklahoma-
legislatur.html   
 67. 15 U.S.C § 77k(e) (2012) (authorizing the court to “require an undertaking for the pay-
ment” of costs “including reasonable attorney’s fees” where “the court believes the suit or the de-
fense to have been without merit”).  The provision was designed to deter “frivolous” litigation, a 
very different standard from the one appearing in the typical fee shifting bylaws.  See Friedman v. 
Ganassi, 853 F.2d 207, 211 (3rd Cir. 1988).   
 68. Strougo, 2015 WL 1189610, at *1. 
 69. Id.at *4.   
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shareholders at the time of bylaw’s adoption,70 an analysis with potential-
ly broad implications.71 
The possibility of federal intervention also became more concrete.72  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expressed concerns 
over the impact of the bylaws on securities actions.  Hearings on the mat-
ter were held before the Investor Advisory Committee at the SEC.73  
Likewise, the Chair of the agency gave a speech indicating that the staff 
was keeping a “close-eye” on the bylaws.74  Some in Congress pushed 
the Commission to act on these provisions.75 
Perhaps most noticeably, legislation was drafted to prohibit fee 
shifting provisions by for-profit companies.76  The Corporation Law 
  
 70. Id. (finding that section 109(b) did “not authorize the adoption of bylaws to regulate the 
rights or powers of former stockholders whose interests in the corporation already have been elimi-
nated.”).  The court also relied on contract principles.  Id. (‘I conclude based on principles of con-
tract law that the Bylaw does not apply to this case because it was adopted after the plaintiff was 
cashed out of the Company by operation of the Reverse Stock Split. More specifically, I hold that 
changes made to the Company’s bylaws after the plaintiff was cashed out are not binding on him for 
the same reason that a non-party to a contract is not bound by the terms of that contract.”); see also 
Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, C.A. No.G050446, 2015 WL 358794, at *6 (Cal. App. 4th. Jan. 28, 
2015) (bylaw not applicable to former members).   
 71. The reasoning could also apply to any other party who never attained the status of share-
holder, including beneficial owners.  Although beneficial owners have some statutory rights in 
Delaware, the courts do not recognize them as shareholders.  See Licht v. Storage Tech. Corp., CA 
No. 524-N, 2015 WL 1252355, at *5 n.29 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2005) (“The brokers hold legal title, as 
the owners of record, and, as far as the corporation is concerned as a matter of Delaware law . . . they 
have the legal authority to vote the shares in person or by proxy. The stock exchanges, however, 
have rules that govern the relationship, for these purposes, between the brokers, as record owners, 
and their customers (the shareholders), as beneficial owners.”). 
 72. See Explanation of Council Legislative Proposal, available at 
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/corporate-governance/legislation/delaware-statutory-revisions-
legislative-history  (“Eventually, other regulators would likely feel compelled to step in.   The feder-
al government might perceive a need to occupy the field of corporate law in order to maintain this 
critical aspect of the national and world economy.  Alternatively, states’ attorney generals might 
look for opportunities to fill the vacuum.”).   
 73. See Agenda: October 9, 2014, Meeting of the Securities and Exchange Commission Inves-
tor Advisory Committee, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac100914-agenda.htm  The IAC 
was authorized in Dodd-Frank.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 911, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf. 
 74. See Chair Mary Jo White, A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015, Tulane Universi-
ty Law School 27th Annual Corporate Law Institute (Mar. 19, 2015) (“Our staff is thus keeping a 
very close eye on the evolving developments [on fee shifting bylaws], and I am too.”), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html.   
 75. See Letter from Senator Blumenthal to Chair White, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 30, 
2014), available at http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-calls-on-
sec-to-protect-critical-check-on-corporate-malfeasance. 
 76. Efforts were made to amend the Delaware law in the immediate aftermath of the ATP 
decision.  The efforts, however, were unsuccessful when opponents to the changes sought delay.  See 
Delaware Legislature Delays Anti-Fee-Shifting Legislation, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM (June 20, 2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/delaware-legislature-
delays-anti-fee-shifting-legislation/; see also S. Res. 12, 147th Sess. (Del. 2014) (resolution calling 
for “continued examination” of fee shifting bylaws), available at 
http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis147.nsf/vwlegislation/29B3C3E91094EE3B85257CFB005ADE25.  
The resolution is available at 
http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/SJR+12/$file/legis.html?open  
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Council developed proposed amendments to the DGCL that, by the 
spring of 2014, had been approved by the state’s bar association and was 
expected to be introduced in the legislature.  The draft legislation provid-
ed that neither the certificate nor the bylaws could include provisions that 
imposed “liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of 
the corporation or any other party in connection with an intracorporate 
claim”.77  Intracorporate disputes included any claims, including claims 
in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a 
duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such ca-
pacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of 
Chancery.”78   
Applying only to “intracorporate” disputes, the proposed legislation 
did not, on its face, preclude fee shifting provisions in the context of ac-
tions brought under the federal securities laws.  At least one commenta-
tor has asserted that the oversight may have been deliberate.79  A more 
likely explanation, however, is that Section 109 does not apply to “exter-
nal” actions, including those brought under the federal securities laws.  
As a result, any explicit language addressing actions under the securities 
laws would be superfluous.  Moreover, affirmative language would sug-
gest that, in fact, Delaware had jurisdiction over federal causes of action, 
a dubious proposition. 
D. Observations 
The ATP Court confronted a bylaw that effectively restricted if not 
eliminated owner instigated litigation against the corporation.  The pov-
erty of the analysis reflects a misreading of the relevant provisions under 
Delaware law.  Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context 
of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only  to 
those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations.80  
  
 77. For a draft of the proposed legislation, go here:  
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/corporate-governance/legislation/delaware-statutory-revisions-
legislative-history. See also Fee-Shifting FAQs, supra note 62, at 3 (“If the ability of stockholders to 
bring lawsuits were seriously curtailed by fee-shifting provisions, a regulator is quite likely to fill the 
void--perhaps the federal government.  In the long term, this would likely be a much more costly 
(and less effective) method of overseeing this relationship than the current lawsuit-based system.”).   
 78. The proposed legislation was not, however, intended “to prevent the application of such 
provisions pursuant to a stockholders agreement or other writing signed by the stockholder against 
whom the provision is to be enforced.” Id.   
 79. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Delaware Throws a Curveball, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 
16, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/03/16/delaware-throws-a-curveball/ (“Was this 
an unintentional oversight made somehow by skillful lawyers?  Possibly, but that 22 member Corpo-
ration Law Council is not staffed with dummies . . .  we need to consider the alternative possibility:  
namely that they deliberately wrote it narrowly.”).   
 80. Indeed, a majority of the Justices on the court at the time of the decision indicated either 
that the rational might not apply to public companies or, at least, that the issue was an open one.  See 
Ridgely, supra note 36, at 19 (“Since the court’s decision in ATP Tour, a number of commentators 
have assumed that it applies equally to for-profit, stock corporations. The Delaware Supreme Court 
did not say that in ATP Tour, so this remains an open question.”); Cindy Posner, A little inside scoop 
in the ATP fee-shifting bylaws case, PUBCO@COOLEY (Nov. 7, 2014), 
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Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that 
does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the 
rights of shareholders.   
IV. STUDENT PAPERS 
In this issue, students have explored in pithy but thorough papers 
assorted issues under Delaware law.  The papers address a myriad of 
subjects, not all of which can be fairly characterized as management 
friendly.  In this issue:   
Robin Alexander has written an article on director independence, 
particularly the cases that address the impact of business and personal 
relationships.  See Director Independence and the Impact of Business and 
Personal Relationships. 
Riley J. Combelic has written an article that focuses on the obliga-
tions of the board of directors in connection with the selection and over-
sight of financial advisors.  See Rural Metro Corp and Ensuring Fairness 
in a Fairness Opinion.   
Charles Gass has looked at the development of the doctrine of 
waste, the safety value that allows actions even for board decisions that 
fall within the business judgment rule.  See Outer Limits:  Fiduciary Du-
ties and the Doctrine of Waste. 
Jennifer McLellan has written an article on appraisal rights and the 
multiple tests used by the courts in assessing share valuation.  See An 
Appraisal of Appraisal Rights in Delaware.   
Gabrielle Palmer has examined the right of shareholders to inspect 
corporate records in the context of socially responsible activity.  See 
Stockholder Inspection Rights and an “Incredible” Basis:  Seeking Dis-
closure Related to Corporate Social Responsibility.   
Patrick J. Rohl  has tackled the development of forum selection by-
laws.  See The Reassertion of the Primacy of Delaware and Forum Selec-
tion Bylaws.   
  
http://cooleypubco.com/2014/11/07/a-little-inside-scoop-in-the-atp-fee-shifting-
bylaws-case/ (“The former Justice [Jacobs] indicated (and please recognize that below is just a 
summary paraphrase of some of his comments as I heard them) that he was surprised that many 
counsel assumed that the holding in the case would be applied in the larger public company context. 
The court, he said, had viewed ATP (a non-stock entity) to be similar to a private club or closely 
held corporation; the types of bylaw arrangements that may be upheld as valid in that context might 
not necessarily be viewed as valid and appropriate for large public companies.”);  Michael Greene, 
Delaware Supreme Court's Chief Justice Voices Support for Fee-Shifting Limitation, 
BLOOMBERGBNA (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.bna.com/delaware-supreme-courts-n17179924991/ (“I 
[Chief Justice Strine] never contemplated fee-shifting in a public company context. It is something 
that never really occurred to me,” he said. While Strine said that in the context of member corpora-
tions a fee-shifting provision could make a lot of sense, such provisions do not make sense for public 
companies to adopt.”).   
 
